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I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment.
The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-specic
public good. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when stable
coalitions exist and obtain that for that to occur o¢ ce benets should exceed a certain level. I analyze
how this critical level and the set of policies implemented are a¤ected by the income levels and the
degree of diversity. For both o¢ ce and policy-motivated parties the same result holds but the critical
level might be lower.
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In many countries governments are formed by multiparty coalitions. As stated by Laver and Schoeld
(1998), many Western European countries have been governed by coalitions for most of the twentieth
century. It is the heterogeneity of preferences in the society that leads to the formation of di¤erent parties
who take di¤erent positions on the existing issues. Therefore, the heterogeneity of preferences leads to a
multi-dimensional political competition. This paper aims to combine these two aspects, heterogeneity and
coalition formation by analyzing which stable governing coalitions can be formed in such an environment
and the policies that would be implemented.
Although preference heterogeneity can lead to a multi-dimensional political competition, in a certain
electoral competition some of these dimensions might be much more relevant than others. That is, some
issues where voters show greater degree of heterogeneity would be the more salient issues where parties
would intent to clearly signal their position and their di¤erence from others. Taking these arguments into
account, I analyze a situation in which voterspreferences show heterogeneity on only two dimensions
perceived as the most salient ones and parties compete on these two dimensions. In particular, I consider
an environment where one of the dimensions is the degree of income taxation and the other dimension
the provision of a certain public good.
In many countries around the world, a certain part of the heterogeneity of preferences of the society
might be due to di¤erences in ethnicity and/or religious beliefs. Those di¤erent ethnic or religious groups
are represented by parties who make promises and policy demands in line with the interest of those
groups. In this paper I analyze a situation where one of the policy dimensions is a result of a ethnic
or religious diversity. More specically, I consider a society whose members di¤er both in their level of
income and also in their ethnicity or religion1 .
Each di¤erent group in the society is represented by a party who has the same ideal policy point as
its potential voters. The government decides on the proportional tax rate and on the amount of public
good provided. The amount of public good provided directly a¤ects the amount of redistribution as the
total tax revenue has to be divided between redistribution and public good provision.
This two dimensional framework can cause preference heterogeneity in two directions: On the one
side people who prefer a high level of taxation and people who prefer no income taxation, and on the
other side people who prefer to have a certain level of public good and others who prefer that no public
good is provided. As the public good can only be provided if there exists a positive income tax, it would
be impossible to satisfy the desire of a group who prefers to have no income taxation and a positive
amount of public good. Therefore, I consider a society which consists of three groups: the rich group
1From now on I will denote this di¤erence as an ethnic one.
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from the ethnic majority, the poor group from the ethnic majority and the poor group from the ethnic
minority. The poor group from the ethnic majority benets from an income redistribution and the poor
minority group in addition to income redistribution also obtains utility from a public good whereas the
rich group is negatively e¤ected by the income redistribution and obtains no utility from the public good.
Educational facilities such as schools which use as the instruction language a language used only by the
ethnic minority, or worship places such as churches or mosques which are only used by the ethnic or
religious minority could be considered as examples where only the minority group would benet from the
provision of such a public good.
I analyze a coalition formation game where rst parties make a policy announcement. Then, voters
vote to the party who makes the announcement they like the most. Then, the votes are transformed
into seats according to ideal proportionality. That is, the seat share of a party equals its vote share. I
consider a case where the rst two steps have already taken place, that is, the election has already taken
place and the seats in the parliament are distributed. More specically, I assume that no party obtains
a majority and some parties have to form a coalition to obtain a majority government.
As in Aragones (2007 a,b), I consider parties who are mainly o¢ ce motivated and care only instru-
mentally about policy. As in these two papers I assume that voters care about the policies implemented.
Thus the parties who represent the voters would be concerned about the policy that would implemented
whenever they form part of the government as compromising their policy position might a¤ect negatively
those partiesfuture voter support. In terms of the utility obtained from being in o¢ ce, I consider the
case where the utility of o¢ ce benets a party obtains depends on its seat share in the parliament and
the seat share in the parliament of its coalition member(s). I assume that parties share spoils of o¢ ce
proportionally to their seat share. I characterize the set of stable coalitions that can be formed and
obtain that when benets of o¢ ce are su¢ ciently large, a stable coalition always exists and is formed by
the two smallest parties. That is, for a stable coalition to exist, the value of the o¢ ce should be higher
than a certain threshold which depends on the seat share of parties, the income levels of the groups in
the society and the degree of diversity in the society.
I obtain that, the higher the degree of diversity the higher should be the benet of being in o¢ ce in
order to guarantee the existence of a stable coalition. The level of income of the rich group has the same
e¤ect. The e¤ect of the level of income of the two poor groups on the threshold of the benets of o¢ ce
depends on which parties would form the government. If the government is formed by the ethnic majority,
the minimum level of o¢ ce spoils needed to guarantee the existence of a stable coalition decreases as the
income of the poor group increases whereas if the ethnic minority group forms part of the government,
the e¤ect of the level of income on the minimum level of o¢ ce spoils needed to guarantee the existence
of a stable coalition would be in the other direction. Moreover, as the seat shares of parties become more
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equal the minimum level of o¢ ce spoils needed to guarantee the existence of a stable coalition increases.
I also obtain that the higher the level of income of the rich the smaller is the set of policies that can be
implemented. An increase in the degree of diversity has the same e¤ect whenever the ethnic minority
forms part of the government.
I extend the above described analysis to nd the conditions under which a stable government would
be formed if parties care both about benets of o¢ ce and policy. I obtain that, as in the case of parties
who care only instrumentally about policy, if the benets of o¢ ce exceed a certain level stable coalitions
would exist. However, in this case it is more likely that stable coalitions exist as the party outside the
government would be willing to give up less to join a coalition in terms of policy compromise.
In a similar framework, Bandiera and Levy (2007) analyze a political game considering endogenous
parties who are solely policy motivated and who might form pre-electoral coalitions and might decide
not to run. The electoral rule they use is plurality, that is the party who obtains the highest amount
of votes is the winner. They obtain that the only stable coalition that can be formed is the one formed
by the rich group from the ethnic majority and the poor group of the ethnic minority whereas I obtain
that a stable coalition would be formed by the two smallest parties whoever those are. In their analysis
the fact that the largest party would win the elections and form the government alone makes it possible
to have a stable coalition when parties are only policy motivated. They also obtain that as the public
good becomes more valuable for the ethnic minority, the tax rate decreases, the public good expenditures
increases and hence the outcome becomes less favorable for the poor majority and more favorable for the
rich group; thus the e¤ect of democracy is diminishing as diversity increases. On the other hand, I obtain
that whenever the ethnic minority forms part of the government an increase in the degree of diversity
would make both the rich and the poor from the ethnic majority worse-o¤ in the sense that the set of
policies that could be implemented would decrease in detriment of those parties but it would make the
poor ethnic minority better-o¤.
2 Model
In this section I rst describe the timing of the electoral game. There exist a certain number of parties
denoted by i where i 2 I. First, each party i makes its policy promise. Then, voters who observe these
promises cast their votes. Then these votes are transformed into seats. The electoral rule is proportional
representation. More specically, I assume that the electoral formula is such that "ideal proportionality"
applies. That is, the seat share of a party equals its vote share. A government can only be formed if it
obtains the support of more than half of the parliamentary members. That is, a majority single party
government can only be formed if one party obtains more than half of the votes. If no party obtains an
absolute majority of seats, then the government should be formed by a majoritarian coalition.
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If no party obtains the majority of seats, they engage in bargaining on which coalition to form and
which policy to implement. In this process, parties aim is to maximize their utility. Parties obtain
utility from being part of the government and from the policy implemented only if they form part of the
government. The utility function of a party i takes the following form:
Vi(C;X) =
(
Bi(C) + Ui(X) if party i forms part of the government
0 if party i does not form part of the government
where C denotes the government coalition formed; Bi(C) is the utility that party i obtains from being
part of coalition C and U
i
(X) is the utility that party i obtains from the policy implemented by the
government given that it forms part of the government and X is the set of policy variables. In what
follows, I rst describe the preferences of the voters and then the political parties.
2.1 Voters
The society consists of a certain number of citizens, N . Each citizen belongs to one of three di¤erent
groups: the rich from the ethnic majority (R), the poor from the ethnic majority (P ) and the poor
from the ethnic minority (E). The size of these three groups are nR, nP , and nE respectively where
nR + nP + nE = N . The income of the poor (both P and E) is yP and the income of R is yR. These
three groups have the following utility functions:
UR(t; T; g) = yR(1  t) + T
UP (t; T; g) = yP (1  t) + T
UE(t; T; g) = yP (1  t) + T + kv(g)
In these utility functions t denotes a proportional tax rate, T is the per capita redistribution and
g denotes the level of public good which is only enjoyed by the ethnic minority, E. v(g) denotes the
utility obtained from this group specic public good. v(g) is assumed to be concave with v0(0) = 1
and v0(1) = 0 such that the ideal point of E forms part of the policy set. The parameter k (k > 0)
measures the degree of diversity in the society: the higher is k the more valued is the public good by the
ethnic minority. The two groups from the ethnic majority obtain only a utility from redistribution and
the ethnic majority obtains utility from both redistribution and the public good.
Voters vote sincerely, that is, they cast their vote to the party that proposes the policy that would
give them the highest utility among all the policy proposals.
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2.2 Parties
In the political environment there are three parties who are competing in the elections. A party is denoted
by i where i 2 I = fP;R;Eg. Each of these three parties represents one of the groups in the society.
Parties care about o¢ ce spoils and only instrumentally about the policy implemented. As stated before,
the utility function of each party takes the following form:
Vi(C;X) =
(
Bi(C) + Ui(X) if party i forms part of the government
0 if party i does not form part of the government
where C denotes the government coalition formed; Bi(C) is the utility that party i obtains from being
part of coalition C and U
i
(X) is the utility that party i obtains from the policy implemented by the
government given that it forms part of the government and X is the set of policy variables.
As each party represents a certain group of the society, I assume that when a party forms part of the
government it obtains the same utility from the policy implemented as the group it represents. Therefore
the utility that obtains a party which forms part of the government from the policy implemented is:
UR(t; T; g) = yR(1  t) + T
UP (t; T; g) = yP (1  t) + T
UE(t; T; g) = yP (1  t) + T + kv(g)
The government that is formed decides on the level of a proportional tax rate, t where 1  t  0,
the level of a public good provision and the per capita income redistribution. Therefore, the budget
constraint of a government is as follows:
tNy = NT + g
where y is the average income. That is, y = yRnR+yP (nP+nE)N . Thus, the government has to decide
on the value of two policy parameters. So, X can be written as X = (t; g).
Using the budget constraint we can dene the indi¤erence curves of the three parties (and groups) in
terms of t and g. As T = ty   gN , we obtain that the indi¤erence curves of P and R have the following
form:





where i 2 fP;Rg. Therefore, 4g4t = N(y   yi) for both groups which implies that these two groups
have linear indi¤erence curves with a positive slope for P as y > yP and with a negative slope for R as
yR > y. Therefore, the ideal policy of P would be (t; g) = (1; 0) as it obtains more utility the higher is t
and the lower is g; and the ideal policy of R would be (t; g) = (0; 0) as it obtains more utility the lower
is t and g.
Similarly, we can obtain the indi¤erence curve of E:
yP + t(y   yP ) 
g
N
+ kv(g) = u
As v(g) is concave and all other terms in the indi¤erence curve are linear, the indi¤erence curves of
E are quasi-concave and the ideal policy would be t = 1 and g such that 1N = kv
0(g). So, the policy








Notice that the maximum amount of g depends on the level of t. Therefore, the maximum amount of
public good that can be provided would correspond to t = 1 and T = 0 i.e. g = Ny. At the ideal point
of E, t = 1 and 1Nk = v
0(g). Therefore, in order to guarantee that g belongs to the policy set we need
that v0(Ny)  1=Nk as v(g) is a concave function.
Now I dene the second element of the utility functions of the parties: B(C). As stated before, I




where B is a positive constant and si is the seat share of party i. That is, parties share a xed
amount of o¢ ce spoils proportionally to their seat shares. As stated before, I assume ideal proportionality.
Thus, the seat share of a party simply equals its vote share.
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As parties represent a specic group each party can only propose the ideal policy of the group it
belongs to. Therefore, as voters vote sincerely, sR = nR=N , sP = nP =N and sE = nE=N which implies





3 Equilibrium Stable Coalitions
In the analysis that follows the key question is that from the whole set of possible majoritarian coalitions
that could be formed which ones would be stable and what would be the policy choice of these coalitions?
A coalition of parties would only implement policies that would lie on the Pareto Set of this coalition
as for any policy outside their Pareto Set they could agree on a di¤erent one which would increase the
utility of at least one of the parties forming part of the government without decreasing the utility of any
of them.
I dene a coalition as stable if all parties forming that coalition could agree on a policy such that
they cannot obtain a higher utility by breaking the coalition and forming another coalition with the third
party. In this section, I rst analyze which stable coalitions might be formed and which set of policies
might be implemented for given parameter values. Then, I show how the set of policies that could be
implemented by a stable coalition would be a¤ected by a change in the degree of diversity, k, the income
level of the rich group, yR, and the income level of the two poor groups, yP .
Therefore, rst of all, we should nd the Pareto Set for each of the possible coalitions. For the coalition
PR, the Pareto Set would be t 2 [0; 1] and g = 0 as they have linear indi¤erence curves with opposite
signed slopes and g a¤ects their utility negatively. For the coalition PE the Pareto Set would be t = 1
and g 2 [0; g] as their utility increases linearly in t. In order to nd the the Pareto Set of the coalition
ER the following maximization problem has to solved:
max
ft;gg




s:to yP + t(y   yP ) 
g
N
+ kv(g)  uE
Solving this maximization problem we obtain that in the Pareto Set t can take any value and g should






That is, the Pareto Set contains policy points with a xed level of g as long as this level is feasible for
a given t < 1. If not, the Pareto Set would be the pairs of t with the highest level of g possible. Notice





is concave. In addition, when t = 1, the Pareto Set includes all points where g takes values between the
level satisfying kv0(g) = yP yRN(y yR) and kv
0(g). The gure below depicts the Pareto sets for all two party
coalitions. If we consider the consensus government PER, one can easily see that for any possible policy
proposition of this coalition government, there exists another policy proposition that can be be proposed









As I described above, I assume that parties who form the government obtain a benet from being in
o¢ ce B(C) and that they share a xed amount of utility among themselves. Moreover, I assume that
parties share the benets of o¢ ce proportionally to their seat share. As the electoral rule is proportional
representation and I consider ideal proportionality the seat share of a party equals its vote share which
is simply the size of the group it represents. Therefore, if two parties i and j form a government the
amount of o¢ ce spoils received by party i is: nini+njB where B is a positive constant. Therefore, if a
party forms part of the government its total utility is the utility obtained from the policy implemented
plus the utility obtained from o¢ ce spoils. If a party does not enter the coalition, and its two rivals form
the coalition then this party would not obtain any utility neither from o¢ ce spoils nor from the policy
implemented. As stated before, I assume that no group constitutes more than half of the society.
In order to be able to obtain explicit results v(g) should take a specic form. For technical reasons I





The rst inequality indicates that the ideal point of E is (t; g) = (1; Ny) and the second one guarantees
that the Pareto Set of RE would be the line connecting their ideal points. The second inequality can be
rewritten as (yR y) > y yPNk 1 . Finding the conditions under which a stable government can be formed and
what policies this government would implement for this specic case, as a next step I obtain implications
for the more general case where v(g) could be any concave function. The next gure shows the Pareto










In this situation, all policies on the Pareto Set of two parties would be acceptable policies, yet when
deciding which coalition to form a party does not only take the policy into account but also the amount
of o¢ ce spoils it would obtain. Notice that, a consensus government consisting of all three parties would
never form as for any possible policy proposal any coalition of two parties would be better-o¤ by deviating
as they would increase their utility obtained from o¢ ce spoils and could agree on a policy point that at
least wouldnt decrease their utility from the implemented policy. Therefore, I focus simply on two party
coalitions.
I rst dene under which conditions parties P and R would form a stable coalition. The result is as
follows2 :
2For a formal proof of all propositions and lemmas see the appendix.
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y yP + 1 and E
is the largest group in the society.
From the proposition above we can see that the necessary condition for PR to form is that E should be











will always be satised. The set of policies that could be implemented by coalition PR would be g = 0










y yP + 1. Moreover, we can observe that
the set of policies that coalition PR could implement does not depend on the degree on diversity, k. As
B a¤ects the left hand side of the policy set positively and the right hand side negatively, as B increases
the set of policies that could be implemented would increase in both directions.
We can also check how the set of implementable policies by PR changes when yR or yP changes.
As y depends on yR and yP we should substitute y with y =
yRnR+yP (nP+nE)
nP+nE+nR















+ 1. Therefore, as yR
increases the left hand side decreases and the right hand increases. Therefore, the set of possible policies
becomes smaller as Rs loss from redistribution would be higher and P would loose more from giving up
on redistribution as the income transfer it would get by forming coalition with E would be higher. On
the other hand, as yP increases the left hand side increases and the right hand side decreases. Therefore,
the set of possible policies becomes larger. The intuition behind this nding is just the reverse of the one
described above for an increase in yR.
With a similar analysis as in Proposition 1 we can nd when parties R and E would form a stable
coalition. The result is as follows:











kNy yP + 1 and P is the
largest group in the society.
From the proposition above we can see that the necessary condition for RE to form is that P should












will always be satised. The set of policies that could be implemented by this coalition would be g = tNy











kNy yP + 1. As B a¤ects the left hand
side of the policy set positively and the right hand side negatively, as B increases, the set of policies that
could be implemented would increase in both directions.
To see how the value of k a¤ects the set of policies that could be implemented we should take





(kNy yP )2 which is always positive. Notice that k does not a¤ect the left hand side as k does
not a¤ect the maximum utility that R can get from P . Therefore, if k increases, the set of policies
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that can be implemented decreases, in the sense that the minimum value of t that can be implemented
increases. The intuition behind this fact is that as k increases, the maximum amount of utility that E
can obtain from P increases which forces R to give up more in favor of E.

















kNy yP +1 increases as y increases. Therefore,
the set of possible policies becomes smaller as the maximum utility in terms of policy they would get
from P would increase.
If yP increases, the left hand side is not a¤ected as yP does not a¤ect the maximum utility that R
can get from P . To see how the right hand side is a¤ected some steps of calculations are needed. The
result is as follows:







Therefore, as yP increases, the set of possible policies becomes smaller in detriment of R. The intuition
behind this fact is that as yP increases, the maximum amount of utility that E can obtain from P increases
which forces R to give up more in favor of E.
Finally, we can also nd under which conditions PE would be formed as a stable coalition. The result
is as follows:








Nk 1 + y and R is the
largest group in the society.
From the proposition above we see that the necessary condition for PE to form is that R should be the











will always be satised. The set of policies that could be implemented by this coalition would be
t = 1 and any g 2 [0; Ny] such that BN( nPnP+nE  
nP
nP+nR


















+ Ny. As B a¤ects the left hand side of the policy set
positively and the right hand side negatively, as B increases, the set of policies that could be implemented
would increase in both directions.
From the inequality above we can see that k does not a¤ect the maximum value that can take g. On




is negative. Therefore, if k increases, the set of policies that can be implemented decreases, in the sense
that the minimum value of g that can be implemented increases. The intuition behind this fact is the
same as in the case of coalition RE.
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An increase in yR doesnt a¤ect the maximum amount of g that P would accept as the loss that P
incurs when forming coalition with E derives only from g. On the other hand, the right hand side would
increase as y would increase (thus the maximum utility that E can obtain from R) and kN > 1. Hence,
the set of possible policies would become smaller in detriment of P . If yP increases the same argument
holds.
From the conditions which dene when a certain coalition can form, we can see that only minimal
winning coalitions in the sense of Riker (1962) form, that is, among all possible coalitions the one with
the lowest total seat share possible forms.
From the propositions above, we have obtained that given that one party obtains more seats than
its rivals a stable coalition would exist for B large enough. Therefore, as a next step I derive how the
minimum value of B necessary for a stable coalitions to exist depends on the incomes and the degree of
diversity. From Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we can obtain that a stable coalition would exist if B is larger


































if nR > nP and nR > nE
Given that, we can nd for all three cases how Bmin is a¤ected by a change in yR, yp and k. I rst
analyze the case when nE > nP and nE > nR. Then, as we can see from above Bmin does not depend on
k. To see how the incomes a¤ect this value, I substitute y with y = yRnR+yP (nP+nE)N . After some steps











. Therefore, as yR increases
Bmin increases, and as yP increases Bmin decreases.
Now suppose that nP > nE and nP > nR. Then as k increases Bmin increases as kNy  yP increases
and   yRkNy yP (
nE
nP+nE
  nEnR+nE ) is positive. To see how Bmin is a¤ected by a change in the incomes











. From Lemma 1 we know that k(nP + nE) > 1.
Thus, as yP increases, Bmin increases. To see how yR a¤ects Bmin, we should take its derivative with re-
spect to yR. Taking nRnE+nR  
nR
nP+nR
= c (where c > 0) and nEnR+nE  
nE
nP+nE














which is always positive. Therefore, as yR increases, Bmin increases.
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On the other hand, if nR > nP and nR > nE then if k increases, then Bmin also increases. If yR or
yP increases, then Bmin also increases as y would increase.
From the analysis above I obtain that as the income of the rich group increases, for a stable coalition
to exist the utility that parties obtain from being in o¢ ce should increase. The same is also true if the
degree of diversity increases. On the other hand, the e¤ect of the income of the poor on Bmin depends
on the seat share, i.e. the relative size of the groups.
From the above conditions it can also be deduced that the value of Bmin depends on how close the
relative seat shares of the parties are. As the seat share of all three parties becomes closer, the value of
Bmin increases. When all three parties have the same vote share a stable coalition fails to exist.
The results show that the policy that a stable coalition might implement forms part of a certain
range. It could be compared the range of t that might be implemented by coalition PR with the one that
might be implemented by RE. Similarly, it can be compared the range of g for coalition RE and PE.
From the above results we know that the range of policies that might be implemented also depend on
the relative size of the parties. Therefore, when I compare the set of possible policies I will interchange
the seat share of two parties and maintain the seat share of the third party. That is, to compare the
range of t for coalitions PR and RE I assume that nE when PR forms is equal to nP when RE forms










kNy yP + 1. The numerator has the same value
in both cases and as it is negative tmin is smaller when PR forms as kN > 1. The maximum value that












numerator has the same value in both cases. Thus, tmax is larger when PR forms. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the range of possible policies is larger when PR forms.
To compare the range of g for coalition RE and PE I assume that nP when RE forms is equal to nR
when PE forms and nE is the same for both cases. Then, the minimum value that g could take (gmin)











kNy yP +Ny as g = tNy.







implying that gmin is smaller when RE










as g = tNy. Thus, gmax is larger when PE forms. Therefore, it can be
concluded it is more likely to have a higher g when PE forms.
3.1 When the Ethnic Minority has a Quasi-Linear Utility Function
In this part, I discuss the implications of the results above to the case when the ethnic minority has a
quasi-linear utility function. That is, individuals of the ethnic minority have the following utility function:
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UE = yP + t(y   yP )   gN + kv(g) where v(g) is a concave function and v
0(Ny) < 1=Nk. When party
E forms part of the government, the utility it obtains from the implemented policy takes also the same
form. Therefore, the Pareto Set of the parties would be the one depicted in Figure 2.
Notice that for a certain stable coalition to exist, the necessary condition would be the same as before,
that is, those parties forming the coalition should be the two smallest ones in terms of their seat shares.
By examining Proposition 1, we can see that the results do no depend on the utility function of E.
Therefore, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for coalition PR to be stable would be the same as in
Proposition 1. Moreover, the e¤ect of a change in k, B, yR or yP would be the same as before.
Considering the case when coalition PE would be formed, given that party R is the largest party in the
society, by reconsidering Proposition 3, the maximum amount of g acceptable by P would not be a¤ected.









 is the level of public good at the ideal point of E satisfying 1N = kv
0(g).
As before, if B is large enough there would exist a g which would give both parties a utility higher than
the maximum they would obtain from R. The main di¤erence from before is that observing the condition
for the minimum g acceptable for E, we can see that it does not depend on yP or yR. The reason is
that unlike the case of completely linear utilities, an increase in the level of incomes does not a¤ect the
maximum utility that party E can get from party R. Therefore, since as before, the maximum amount
of g acceptable for P does not depend neither on yP nor yR, a change in the level of incomes would have
no e¤ect on the set of policies that could be implemented by the coalition PE.
As before, an increase in k would have no e¤ect on the maximum level of g acceptable for party P .
On the other hand, if k increases, as 1N = kv
0(g) and v(g) is concave, g would increase which implies
that the maximum utility that party E would obtain from party R would increase not only because k
increases but also because g does. Therefore, the utility that party E should get from party P should
also increase more than the simple increase of k which implies that the minimum level of g acceptable
for E should also increase. Thus, as in the case of linear utilities as k increases the set of policies that
can be implemented by PE would become smaller in detriment of P and the poor group of the ethnic
majority.
Finally, if we consider the case when RE could form a stable coalition, from Figure 2 we can see
that the Pareto Set of these two parties is di¤erent than when the ethnic minority has linear preferences
(Figure 3). The Pareto Set of RE consists of three di¤erent parts. I will focus on the case where the set
of policies that could be implemented by a stable coalition of RE would only be part of their Pareto Set












In that case the value of g on their Pareto Set, denoted as gPS , that would be implemented should
satisfy equation (2), i.e. kv0(gPS) = yP yRN(y yR) . Therefore, from the same argument as in Proposition 2,
for RE to form, R should be able to get more utility from E than the maximum it could get from P ,







yR y . Similarly, E should be able to get more utility
from R than the maximum it could get from P , i.e. t should be such that B nEnR+nE + (1   t)yP + ty  








). As before, for RE to form, the two inequalities above
should have a common solution which implies that P should be the largest group in the society and B
should take a value su¢ ciently large. Moreover, as B increases the set of policies that coalition RE could
implement would also increase.
Now, I analyze how a change in yR or yP would a¤ect the set of policies that could be implemented
by coalition RE. First, I rewrite kv0(gPS) = yP yRN(y yR) . Substituting y with
yRnR+yP (nP+nE)
N we obtain




= 1nP+nE . Therefore, a change in the levels of income would
have no e¤ect on gPS . As kv0(g) = 1N it has no e¤ect on g







yR y we can obtain that the maximum t satisfying it would decrease as yR   y would
increase. (The increase in yR would be more than the increase in y). For E, as yR increases the minimum
amount of t acceptable would increase as y would increase. Therefore, the set of possible policies would
become smaller. As the level of incomes has no e¤ect on gPS which takes a constant value, the intuition
behind the e¤ect of a change in the income levels on the set of policies that could be implemented is the
same as in the case of coalition PR.
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obtain that the maximum t satisfying it would increase. To see how it would a¤ect the minimum value
of t acceptable for party E we have to analyze how an increase in yP a¤ects (1   t)yP + ty   y which
can be written as (1  t)nRyP nRyRnR+nP+nE . Therefore, as yP increases, the minimum value of t would decrease.
Thus, as yP increases, the set of possible policies would become larger.
Finally I analyze how the set of policies that could be implemented by coalition RE would be af-
fected if the degree of diversity, k, increases. Since kv0(gPS) = 1nP+nE and v(g) is concave, as k








yR y , as k increases, the maximum t satisfying it would decrease. Since
kv0(g) = 1N , as k increases, g
 also increases. Hence, to nd whether the minimum t that party E would
accept would increase or decrease as k increases we should nd whether kv(g) g=N or kv(gPS) gPS=N
would increase more.
In order to achieve this goal, for illustrative reasons, I will take a specic function for v(g): namely
v(g) = g
1















4 . Thus, the increase in kv(g









































4N ). After some
steps, this expression can be reduced as   14 (k
2   k21)( 2(nP + nE) + N + (nP + nE)2N > 0. Notice
that   14 (k
2   k21) > 0, so this inequality holds if  2(nP + nE) + N + (nP + nE)2N > 0. So, we need
N > 2(nP+nE)(nP+nE)2+1 which increases in (nP + nE). So, if it holds for the maximum value of (nP + nE), i.e.
N , it would always hold. If nP + nE = N , then we have N3   N > 0 which always holds as N > 1.
Therefore, as k increases we should nd whether kv(g)  g=N would increase more which implies that
as k increases the minimum t that E would accept would increase. Thus, as k increases the set of policies
that coalition RE could implement becomes smaller.
Comparing the case of linear and quasi-linear utilities, we can see that it does not a¤ect the analysis
for the case where coalition PR forms. When coalition PE forms the only di¤erence is that the income
has no e¤ect on the policies that could be implemented, as the maximum amount of utility that party E
can get from party R does not depend on it. When RE forms, by focusing on the part of their Pareto
Set where the level of g is constant, the e¤ect of the income is as in the case for coalition PR since the
income would be the only variable of conict.
3.2 When Parties are both O¢ ce and Policy Motivated
In this section I analyze the conditions for the existence of a stable coalition and the set of policies the
stable coalition can be implement when parties obtain a utility from being in o¢ ce and also from the
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policy implemented whether they form part of the government or not. That is, I consider the case of










(t; g) if party i forms part of the government
Ui(t; g) if party i does not form part of the government
As in the rst part of the previous analysis I consider the case where the utility function of the
ethnic minority is linear and has the same characteristics as before. That is, v(g) = g and k > 1N and
(yR   y) > y yPNk 1 . For a similar reasoning as before, only two party governments would be formed. In
this case the main result is as follows:
Proposition 4: When parties are both o¢ ce and policy motivated, it might be more likely that a
stable coalition is formed compared to the case where parties care only instrumentally about policy but
it will never be less likely.
The intuition behind the main result obtained here; that is, the intuition why stable coalitions could
form easier when parties care about policy is that the maximum that the party staying outside the
government would be willing to give to one of the two parties forming the government might be less,
since now staying outside the government gives this party a higher utility than before. Thus, parties
would form a stable coalition for a larger set of policies. As before, as it is shown in the proof of
Proposition 4 the necessary condition for a two party stable coalition to form is that the third party
staying out of the government should be the party who obtains the highest amount of seats.3
Both for o¢ ce and instrumentally policy motivated and for o¢ ce and policy motivated parties we
have obtained that for a stable coalition to exist the benets of o¢ ce should be large enough. This result
implies that if parties are only policy motivated no stable coalition would exist.
On the other hand, if parties were solely o¢ ce motivated then the smallest parties would form the
government and they would implement any policy independent of the level of incomes or the degree of
diversity.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The results of this paper show that in a multi-dimensional political environment, where parties are
principally o¢ ce motivated and care only instrumentally about policy or when parties are both o¢ ce and
3For the set of policies that might be implemented by a stable coalition and for the mathematical conditions that a
stable coalition is more likely see the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix.
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policy motivated, for a stable government coalition to exist the benets of o¢ ce that the coalition would
share should be large enough. Given the distribution of votes, the income levels of the di¤erent groups
and the degree of diversity, the utility obtained from o¢ ce spoils should exceed a certain level. As the
level of income of the rich or the degree of diversity in terms of the desire for a public good increases this
critical value also increases. When parties are both o¢ ce and policy motivated it is more likely that a
stable coalition exists.
While in some countries where no party obtains a majority the duration of governments is short in
other countries despite the multidimensionality of the political environment some parties can agree on
forming a government which manages to remain in power for a long period. The results obtained in this
model sheds light on this di¤erence in the sense that one explanation could be that the higher the level of
income of the rich part of the society or the higher the degree of diversity in the society the more di¢ cult
would be to have stable a coalition government.
On the other hand, while in some countries as it happened recently in Belgium it might take a long
time to form a government in other countries the coalition formation process terminates in a short time.
This variation in the time and e¤ort spent to form a government could also be a result of both the
di¤erence of the di¢ culty to have the necessary conditions to form a stable government and the degree
of diversity in terms of preferences that would force parties to give up more in terms of preferred policies
to reach a compromise.
In the model analyzed in this paper the two dimensions are interrelated in the sense that the maximum
amount of public good that can be provided depends on the tax rate implemented. Therefore, the policy
set has the shape of a triangle. This framework helps to analyze a situation where the conict in economic
terms in the society does not only arise from the degree of taxation but also from how the collected taxes
would be redistributed. On the other hand, the main results of the model do not depend on this specic
framework. If we would consider two dimensions which are not interrelated and where the ideal points of
the three parties are such that they would form a triangle, as in the model at hand for a stable coalition
to exist the benets of o¢ ce should be higher than a certain value where this value would depend on the
parameters which dene the diversity in preferences. The distinctive feature of the framework used in the
model at hand is that it allows to analyze the e¤ect of diversity not only on the non-economic dimension
but also how diversity would a¤ect the policy compromise on the economic dimension.
In this paper, I have considered that parties obtain a positive utility from being in o¢ ce and forming
a government. Alternatively, we could also consider a case where parties would obtain a negative utility
from forming a coalition with another party in top of the possible loss in terms of the implemented policy.
This disutility or cost could be interpreted as the time and e¤ort spent to reach an agreement or simply a
non-policy disutility on sharing the power with parties who represent another socioeconomic group. The
19
cost that a party would face by forming a coalition with another party could be analyzed in a similar
way as I analyze the distribution of o¢ ce spoils. That is, we could consider that the cost a party faces by
forming a coalition with another party increases as the size of the other party increases and decreases as
its own size increases. In that case, depending on the degree of disutility each party faces with any of its
rival, di¤erent stable coalitions might exist. Contrary to the case at hand for a stable coalition to exist
the level of costs should be lower than a certain critical level but always positive since with no cost or
benets as this paper shows there would exist no stable coalition. The next step would be to analyze the
exact characterization of the conditions that guarantee the existence of stable coalitions and to describe
how the income levels and the degree of diversity would a¤ect both the policy outcome and the stable
coalitions that would form.
In this paper I have considered voters who vote sincerely, that is, voters cast their vote to the party
that makes the policy announcement they like the most. It would be interesting to analyze under the
same framework dened in this model whether the set of stable coalitions and the policies they would
implement would be a¤ected if voters are forward-looking in the sense that when deciding to which party
to cast their vote they would take into account their expectation about which government would be
formed.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For the coalition PR to be stable there should exist a policy supported by PR
which gives them at least the same amount of utility they could maximally obtain from forming coalition
with E. This policy supported by PR should be on their Pareto Set, i.e., t 2 [0; 1], g = 0. If P and R form
a coalition then E would obtain no utility, so E would be willing to form a coalition with P for any policy
on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility that P can get from forming coalition with E is when
t = 1 and g = 0. Then, VP = nPnP+nEB + y. Thus, the policy o¤er that R can make P (t 2 [0; 1], g = 0)
should satisfy yP + t(y   yP ) + nPnP+nRB >
nP
nP+nE











y yP and nE > nR, P would not break the
coalition with R, but then, as E would prefer to form a coalition with R to being outside the government,
E would be willing to form a coalition with R for any policy on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum
utility that R can get from forming coalition with E is when t; g = 0, i.e. VR = nRnR+nEB + yR. So, the









yR y . Therefore, PR would be a










y yP and E is the largest group. #
Proof of Proposition 2: From the same argument as in Proposition 1, coalition RE will form if
both R and E cannot increase their utility by breaking the coalition and forming another coalition with P .
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That is, there should exist a policy supported by RE which gives them at least the same amount of utility
they would maximally obtain from forming coalition with P . This policy supported by RE should be on
their Pareto Set, i.e., t 2 [0; 1], g = tNy. If E and R form a coalition then P would obtain no utility, so P
would be willing to form a coalition with R for any policy on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility
that R can get from forming coalition with P is when t = 0 and g = 0. Then VR = nRnR+nP B + yR. Thus
















and nP > nE , R would not break the coalition with E, but then, as P would prefer to form a coalition
with E to being outside the government, P would be willing to form a coalition with E for any policy on
their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility that E can get from forming coalition with P is when t = 1
and g = Ny, i.e. VE = nEnP+nEB + kNy. So, the policy o¤er that R should make E (t 2 [0; 1], g = tNy)
should satisfy (1   t)yP + ktNy + nEnR+nEB >
nE
nP+nE
B + kNy which would only hold if nP > nR and
















kNy yP and P is the largest group. #










kNy yP + 1. So, to see
how an increase in yP a¤ects this expression, we have to nd how it a¤ects the denominator, kNy   yP ,
which can be written as k[yRnR + yP (nP + nE)]   yP . So, this expression would increase in yP if
k(nP + nE) > 1. We had assumed that (yR   y) > y yPNk 1 . As nR  nP + nE , we should have that
yR   y  y   yP which implies that yR yy yP  1 >
1
Nk 1 . Thus, Nk > 2. Hence, k(nP + nE) > 1 as
the minimum value that can take nP + nE is N2 which implies that kNy   yP increases as yP increases.





kNy yP also increases as B(
nE
nE+nP
  nEnR+nE ) < 0. #
Proof of Proposition 3: From the same argument as in Proposition 1, coalition PE will form if
both P and E cannot increase their utility by breaking the coalition and forming another coalition with R.
That is, there should exist a policy supported by PE which gives them at least the same amount of utility
they would maximally obtain from forming coalition with R. This policy supported by PE should be on
their Pareto Set, i.e., t = 1, g 2 [0; Ny]. If E and P form a coalition then R would obtain no utility, so R
would be willing to form a coalition with P for any policy on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility
that R can get from forming coalition with P is when t = 1 and g = 0. Then, VP = nPnR+nP B+y. Thus the
policy o¤er that E can make P (t = 1, g 2 [0; Ny]) should satisfy y  gN +
nP
nP+nE
B > nPnR+nP B+ y which
would only hold if nR > nE and g is such that g < BN( nPnP+nE  
nP
nR+nP




and nR > nE , P would not break the coalition with E, but then, as R would prefer to form a coalition
with E to being outside the government, R would be willing to form a coalition with E for any policy
on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility that E can get from forming coalition with R is when
t = 1 and g = Ny, i.e. VE = nEnR+nEB + kNy. So the policy o¤er that P should make E (t = 1,
g = [0; Ny]) should satisfy kg + y   gN +
nE
nP+nE
B > nEnR+nEB + kNy which would only hold if nR > nP
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. Therefore, PE would be a stable coalition if and only








Nk 1 + y and R is the largest group. #
Proof of Proposition 4: I analyze separately the conditions under which each of the three two
party coalitions would be stable. i. For PR to form there should exist a policy supported by PR which
gives them at least the same amount of utility they could maximally obtain from forming coalition with
E. This policy supported by PR should be on their Pareto Set, i.e. t 2 [0; 1], g = 0. If P and R
form a coalition then E would obtain as utility the policy implemented by PR. However, for any policy
implemented by PR (including t = 1, g = 0), party E would be better o¤ by forming a coalition with P
as it would increase its total utility. So E would be willing to form a coalition with P for any policy on
their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility that P can get from forming coalition with E is when t = 1
and g = 0. Then, VP = nPnP+nEB + y. Thus, the policy o¤er that R can make P (t 2 [0; 1], g = 0) should
satisfy yP + t(y   yP ) + nPnP+nRB >
nP
nP+nE






y yP + 1. Supposing that these two conditions hold P would never break the coalition
with R. However, then for any policy that could implement PR, RE could agree on a policy on their
Pareto Set which would increase their utility obtained from the policy implemented. Thus for PR to be
stable as a necessary condition we need nE > nP such that for any such policy the total utility of R
would decrease. If this necessary condition also holds then the best policy o¤er that E would be willing
to make R would be the policy point on the Pareto Set of RE (t 2 [0; 1], g = tNy) that would give E





y yP +1 and g = 0. For this









). Thus the best policy point that E would o¤er R would be the policy point on their
Pareto Set satisfying yP + t(y yP )  ty+ktNy+B nEnE+nR = y+B(
nP
nP+nE















) then t  0 such
that E would be willing to accept the ideal point of R implying that PR would form for exactly the same
conditions as in Proposition 1. On the other hand, if y   yP > B( nPnP+nR +
nE
nE+nR
  nPnE+nP ) then t > 0;












less than before implying that R would be willing to accept a larger set of policies when it forms coalition
























































y yP + 1 and E is the largest group. ii. For PE to form there should exist a policy sup-
ported by PE which gives them at least the same amount of utility they could maximally obtain from
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forming coalition with R. This policy supported by PE should be on their Pareto Set, i.e., t = 1,
g 2 [0; Ny]. If P and E form a coalition then R would obtain as utility the policy implemented by
PE. However, for any policy implemented by PE (including t = 1, g = 0), party R would be better
o¤ by forming a coalition with P as it would increase its total utility. So R would be willing to form
a coalition with P for any policy on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility that P can get from
forming coalition with R is when t = 1 and g = 0. Then, VP = nPnP+nRB + y. Thus, the policy o¤er





B + y which would
only hold if nR > nE and g is such that g < BN( nPnP+nE  
nP
nP+nR
). Supposing that these two conditions
hold P would never break the coalition with E. However, then for any policy that could implement
PE, RE could agree on a policy on their Pareto Set which would increase their utility obtained from
the policy implemented. Thus for PE to be stable as a necessary condition we need nR > nP such
that for any such policy the total utility of E would decrease. If this necessary condition also holds
then the best policy o¤er that R would be willing to make E would be the policy point on the Pareto
Set of RE (t 2 [0; 1], g = tNy) that would give R the same utility that it would obtain when PE
implements g = BN( nPnP+nE  
nP
nP+nR




). Thus the best policy point that R would o¤er to E would be the policy point on
their Pareto Set satisfying yR + t(y   yR)  tNy=N +B nRnE+nR = y  B(
nP
nP+nE










. Notice that if y  B( nRnE+nR +
nP
nE+nP
  nPnR+nP ) then t  1 such
that R would be willing to accept the ideal point of E implying that PE would form for exactly the same
conditions as in Proposition 3. On the other hand, if y > B( nRnE+nR +
nP
nE+nP
  nPnR+nP ) then t < 1; so










which is less than before implying that E would be willing to accept a larger set of policies when it
forms coalition with P . So, the policy o¤er that P should make E (t = 1, g 2 [0; Ny]) should satisfy
y + g(k   1N ) +
nE
nP+nE









] + B nEnE+nR which im-

















Therefore, when y > B( nRnE+nR +
nP
nE+nP




















Nk 1 and R is the
largest group. iii. For RE to form there should exist a policy supported by RE which gives them
at least the same amount of utility they could maximally obtain from forming coalition with P . This
policy supported by RE should be on their Pareto Set, i.e., t 2 [0; 1], g = tNy. If R and E form a
coalition then P would obtain as utility the policy implemented by RE. However, for any policy im-
plemented by RE (including t = 0, g = 0), party P would be better o¤ by forming a coalition with R
as it would increase its total utility. So P would be willing to form a coalition with R for any policy
on their Pareto Set. Thus, the maximum utility that R can get from forming coalition with P is when
t; g = 0. Then, VR = nRnP+nRB + yR. Thus, the policy o¤er that E can make R (t = 1, g 2 [0; Ny])
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should satisfy yR(1   t) + nRnR+nEB >
nR
nP+nR







. Supposing that these two conditions hold R would never break the coalition
with E. However, then for any policy that could implement RE, PE could agree on a policy on their
Pareto Set which would increase their utility obtained from the policy implemented. Thus for RE to
be stable as a necessary condition we need nP > nR such that for any such policy the total utility of
E would decrease. If this necessary condition also holds then the best policy o¤er that P would be
willing to make to E would be the policy point on the Pareto Set of PE (t = 1, g 2 [0; Ny]) that would






and g = tNy.






]yP . Thus the best policy point




















then g  Ny such that P would be willing to accept
the ideal point of E implying that RE would form for exactly the same conditions as in the Proposition






then g < Ny; so the maximum that










less than before implying that E would be willing to accept a larger set of policies when it forms coalition
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